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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
Nos. 10-2896 & 10-2897 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES MURPHY, 
a/k/a Jimmy Murphy,  
a/k/a Black 
 
       James Murphy, 
        Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action Nos. 1-08-cr-00433-001 / 1-10-mc-00168-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 6, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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 Following a two-day jury trial, Appellant James Murphy was found guilty of one 
count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin and 50 grams or more 
of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and one count of engaging in a 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and 50 grams or more 
of cocaine base, also in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.  Murphy was sentenced to 
360 months‟ imprisonment, and now appeals his conviction and sentence.  We affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary for 
our decision.  In July 2008, the police arrested a drug dealer who informed them that she 
had been selling drugs for Murphy off and on for nearly a year, selling approximately 
one gram of heroin per day and one ounce of crack cocaine each week.  Murphy was 
indicted in December 2008.  His trial was initially scheduled for March 2009; however, 
the trial was continued several times because two separate attorneys withdrew from 
representing Murphy and because his trial counsel later sought and obtained multiple 
additional continuances.     
 The trial ultimately began on July 13, 2009.  On that day, Murphy requested that 
the District Court issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for two incarcerated 
witnesses, Clifton Shields and Richard Byrd.  At no time prior to this did Murphy 
indicate that he believed that these witnesses were necessary to mount his defense.   
 In each motion seeking a writ, Murphy used the same single-line explanation as to 
why the two witnesses were needed:  “[The requested witness] will testify that the 
Defendant in this matter, James Murphy, was not involved in the sale or distribution of 
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drugs.”  However, during a discussion held on the record, Murphy‟s counsel conceded 
that he had conferred with counsel for Shields and Byrd, and been informed that they 
would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to testify.  After conferring with 
the United States Marshal‟s Service and learning that the earliest Byrd could be produced 
was a week later, and the earliest Shields could be produced was two weeks later, with 
neither guaranteed, the District Court denied Murphy‟s motions for writs of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum.   
 On the first day of trial, the Government called Jesse Hamman, a convicted drug 
dealer then facing additional weapon charges, as a witness.  Hamman testified as to his 
awareness of an individual nicknamed “Black” and his conversations with Murphy, who 
was in jail with him at the time.  During those conversations, Murphy admitted to being 
“Black,” discussed the time “the FBI came up on him in Lewistown,” and identified 
another individual who had previously left cocaine in Hamman‟s car.  Murphy did not 
object to the admission of Hamman‟s testimony. 
 On the second day of trial, the Government called Officer Robert Haines, Jr., of 
the Mifflin County Regional Police Department.  Officer Haines testified regarding a 
January 2008 encounter with Murphy and some of Murphy‟s associates that ultimately 
led to the discovery of drug distribution paraphernalia in a backpack carried by Murphy 
after two of his associates were arrested for having outstanding warrants and after 
Murphy voluntarily consented to the search of the bag.  Murphy did not object to the 
admission of Officer Haines‟ testimony, nor was any suppression motion filed. 
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 Following trial, the jury found Murphy guilty of both of the drug charges.  As 
noted, the District Court sentenced him to 360 months‟ imprisonment. 
II. 
 In this appeal, Murphy raises three points of error in the District Court‟s handling 
of the trial.  First, he argues that the Court abused its discretion and violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor by 
denying his motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.  Second, Murphy 
contends that the District Court committed plain error by admitting the testimony of 
Hamman, the claim being that Hamman was a “government informant[ ] who had 
deliberately elicited information after [Murphy] had been indicted, in violation of 
[Murphy‟s] Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  Third, Murphy asserts that the District 
Court committed plain error by admitting Officer Haines‟ testimony regarding the drug 
distribution paraphernalia found in Murphy‟s backpack, the search of which Murphy 
complains violated his Fourth Amendment rights.   
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
 Because Murphy did not object at trial, we review the District Court‟s decision to 
admit the testimony of Hamman and Officer Haines for plain error.  United States v. 
Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Errors that were not raised before the District 
Court are subject to plain error review, meaning that, in order to prevail on appeal, a 
defendant must establish an error that is plain, which affected his substantial rights, and 
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which, if not rectified, would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”).   
IV. 
 A. The Motions For Writs Of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum  
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion, nor did it violate Murphy‟s Sixth 
Amendment rights, by denying the motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.   
 A federal court may, in its discretion, issue such a writ to secure the appearance of 
a prisoner as a witness if it is necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify or for 
trial.  28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5).  A district court‟s decision whether to issue the writ will be 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion.  Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
1980).     
 The criminal defendant bears the burden of producing facts that will justify 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.  United States v. Cruz-Jiminez, 
977 F.2d 95, 103 (3d Cir. 1992).   
If the accused avers facts which, if true, would be relevant to 
any issue in the case, the requests for [writs] must be granted, 
unless the averments are inherently incredible on their face, 
or unless the Government shows, either by introducing 
evidence or from matters already of record, that the 
averments are untrue or that the request is otherwise 
frivolous. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1991)).   
 “[I]t is also appropriate to place the burden of proving the necessity of a witness‟s 
testimony on the defendant seeking the writ.”  Id.  “A defendant‟s failure to carry this 
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burden „is a legitimate basis to deny a request to procure the presence of a witness.‟”  Id.  
(quoting United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir. 1987)).   
 Here, the District Court had multiple legitimate bases upon which to deny 
Murphy‟s motions.  As an initial matter, the motions were untimely, as Murphy waited 
until the first day of trial—indeed, he waited until after the trial had begun—before 
requesting the writs.  Rinchack, 820 F.2d at 1568 (“[A] district court may refuse to issue 
a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum solely on the grounds that the petition is 
untimely. . . .  The trial court in this case had ample grounds to deny Rinchack‟s petition 
as untimely[ ] [because he] . . . did not file the request until the trial actually began.”); 
ITEL Capital Corp. v. Dennis Mining Supp. & Equip., Inc., 651 F.2d 405, 407-08 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying petition for writ 
filed three days before trial); Peppard v. United States, 314 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 1963) 
(holding same for petition filed four days before trial).  The District Court properly could 
have denied the motions on this basis alone.   
 Murphy also failed to satisfy his burden of proving the relevancy and necessity of 
Shields‟ and Byrd‟s putative testimony.  As a practical matter, Murphy‟s delay in filing 
the motions significantly undermines his argument that the proposed witnesses would 
have provided relevant and necessary testimony.  If Shields‟ and Byrd‟s putative 
testimony truly were relevant and necessary to his defense, we presume Murphy would 
have moved for the writs much earlier than the first day of trial.  Further, Murphy‟s 
motions provided exactly one sentence of explanation for why he wished to have Shields 
and Byrd produced, and it was the same sentence for both:  to repeat, “[The requested 
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witness] will testify that the Defendant in this matter, James Murphy, was not involved in 
the sale or distribution of drugs.”  Such a conclusory allegation unsupported by any 
factual proffer does not satisfy Murphy‟s burden of proof.  See Smith, 924 F.2d at 896 
(“unsupported and conclusory claims are not sufficient”); Rinchack, 820 F.2d at 1568 
(upholding denial of writ where defendant failed to provide an offer of proof); Peppard, 
314 F.2d at 625 (holding that district court did not abuse discretion by denying writ 
where defendant made no indication of what testimony the witness was expected to 
offer); United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir. 1972) (no abuse of discretion 
for court to deny writ where defendant made insufficient proffer as to content of 
witness‟s expected testimony), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).  Moreover, there is 
nothing in the record indicating that Shields and Byrd would have provided testimony 
favorable to Murphy, as counsel for Murphy conceded he had been informed by the 
attorneys for both Shields and Byrd that they were recommending that their clients 
invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and refuse to testify at Murphy‟s trial.  In this 
context, Murphy failed to satisfy his burden of proving the relevancy and necessity of 
Shields‟ and Byrd‟s putative testimony.   
 Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Murphy‟s 
motions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.  
 B. Jesse Hamman‟s Testimony 
 The District Court did not commit plain error by admitting Hamman‟s testimony.  
Murphy contends that this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because Hamman was a “government informant[ ] who had deliberately elicited 
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information after [Murphy] had been indicted[.]”  However, this contention fails outright 
because there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support a finding that Hamman 
was a “government informant.”   
 As the Supreme Court has stated, “the Sixth Amendment is not violated 
whenever—by luck or happenstance—the State obtains incriminating statements from the 
accused after the right to counsel has attached.”  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 
(1985).  For the Sixth Amendment to be violated in the context of a jailhouse informant, 
“[a]t a minimum . . . there must be some evidence that an agreement, express or implied, 
between the [informant] and a government official existed at the time the elicitation takes 
place.”  Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 893 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Murphy has not pointed to any evidence in the record indicating that Hamman 
reached an express or implied agreement with the Government prior to his jailhouse 
conversation with Murphy.  As such, there is nothing even remotely supporting Murphy‟s 
claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated.   
 Accordingly, the District Court did not commit plain error by admitting 
Hamman‟s testimony. 
       C. Officer Haines‟ Testimony 
 The District Court also did not commit plain error by admitting Officer Haines‟ 
testimony regarding the contents of Murphy‟s backpack that was searched by Mifflin 
County police.  Based on the uncontroverted facts of the encounter as described by 
Officer Haines—including, most importantly, that two of Murphy‟s associates had 
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outstanding warrants and were suspected drug traffickers, and that Murphy voluntarily 
consented to the search of the backpack—it simply cannot be said that admission of 
Haines‟ testimony was “clear or obvious” legal error.  At the least, the issues of whether 
the police officers had probable cause to arrest Murphy and to conduct a search of the 
backpack as incident to the arrest, and whether Murphy‟s voluntary consent to search the 
backpack was valid, are “subject to reasonable dispute.”  See United States v. Marcus, 
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (an error is plain if, among other things, it is “clear or 
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 As resolution of these questions is anything but “clear or obvious,” see id.,  the 
District Court did not commit plain error by admitting Officer Haines‟ testimony.                 
V. 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Murphy‟s conviction and sentence. 
 
